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CAN THE PRESIDENT REALLY AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH?
PRESIDENTIAL EFFORT AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE
CHRIS ROHLFS, RYAN SULLIVAN and ROBERT MCNAB∗
Presidential elections are often seen as referendums on the health of the economy;
however, little evidence exists on the president’s ability to influence gross domestic
product (GDP). This study examines the effect of the incentive to be reelected and the
resulting increase in presidential effort on GDP growth. Growth is found to rise in
reelection years for first-term presidents after 1932 and to fall in election years before
1932, when reelection was uncommon, and for second-term presidents generally. This
effect is largest for high-quality presidents—who probably have the highest return to
effort—and is spread across multiple sectors of the economy. (JELD78, D72, E32, J24)
I. INTRODUCTION
Presidential election is often seen as a ref-
erendum on the performance of the economy.
Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980 with
a campaign that asked the question, “Are you
better off now than you were 4 years ago?” and
Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign centered on the
reminder, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Mitt Rom-
ney, the 2012 Republican Presidential nominee,
campaigned on his business acumen, strong eco-
nomic performance of Massachusetts while he
was governor, and his ability to “turn the econ-
omy around” (Lowry 2012). These slogans and
arguments reflect the widespread belief among
voters that economic growth is substantially
affected by actions taken by the president.
Extensive research has shown that economic
factors affect votes to reelect a president (Fair
1996; Silver 2011), but little concrete evidence
exists on the causal relationship between pres-
idential actions and economic performance.
Assassinations of country leaders do not affect
long-term economic growth (Jones and Olken
2009) and changes in the presidency in the
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United States do not appear to significantly influ-
ence growth in gross domestic product (GDP)
(Alesina and Rosenthal 1995).1 Historians rank
presidents based partly upon their ability to man-
age the economy (Schlesinger 1997; Wikipedia
2011). Economic performance varies widely
from year to year, however, and executives
who presided over periods of growth may have
simply been lucky. The degree to which GDP
responds to presidential behavior is of enormous
practical importance to voters and policymakers
and for general understanding about how the
economy functions.
This article uses a novel estimation strategy
to measure the extent to which a president’s
actions influence economic growth. If gover-
nors and mayors, for example, exert effort to
hire additional police officers during reelection
years (Levitt 1997), then we may reasonably
argue that presidents may exert effort to improve
GDP growth in similar circumstances. Addi-
tionally, unlike unemployment, which is con-
strained by the “stickiness” of the labor mar-
ket, GDP growth may be relatively malleable in
the short term, as it can be affected by changes
1. We should note that Alesina and Rosenthal’s work
does not differentiate between high- and low-quality presi-
dents, and it is not clear by how much or in what direction
one might expect growth to change after specific changes
in presidents.
ABBREVIATIONS
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNP: Gross National Product
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in hours per worker or usage of existing equip-
ment. In a reelection year, the president faces
an incentive to divert energy away from other
objectives (e.g., improving national security) and
toward increasing economic growth or to time
growth-inducing policies to take effect in elec-
tion years. Given modern term limits, this incen-
tive only applies to first-term presidents. If the
president’s effort and policies influence economic
growth, we should see especially high levels of
growth in election years for first-term presidents,
and we should observe no such effect among
second-term presidents.
A large literature exists on the “political busi-
ness cycle,” and the extent to which growth rises
in election years. Previous work on the United
States has generally used data from only a few
decades and has found mixed results, with some
researchers finding large effects (Drazen 2000;
Grier 2008; Nordhaus 1975) and others find-
ing no such effect (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen
1997). Those who find an effect attribute it to “ar-
tificial” increases caused by monetary or fiscal
policy. However, such studies have failed to iden-
tify robust election cycles in inflation or govern-
ment spending or evidence of post-election year
crashes (Alesina et al. 1997 andDrazen 2000 pro-
vide reviews). This study is the first to propose
that the election year effect reflects a true increase
in economic performance that is caused by an
increase in presidential effort. Unlike in previ-
ous studies, data are used on every U.S. president
from GeorgeWashington to Barack Obama. New
cuts of the data are presented to examine how
this effect varies over time, with the character-
istics of the president, and across sectors of the
economy. Unlike in many of these previous stud-
ies, the regressions presented here do not control
for potentially endogenous macroeconomic vari-
ables and focus purely on the essentially random
cyclical variation in election years.
While somewhat imprecise, the estimates
indicate that increased presidential effort in
election years leads to substantial increases in
growth. For first-term presidents since 1933,
real GDP growth has been from 1.0 to 2.7%
percentage points higher in the third and fourth
years of office than in the first 2 years. This
effect matches up roughly with the election
cycle, beginning 1 year before the election in
the third quarter of the third year. No crashes
occur immediately afterward in the beginning
of presidents’ second terms, and no election
year effect appears for second-term presidents.
In some specifications, growth declines signif-
icantly in the fourth year of the second term,
when the president’s departure is imminent. A
similar negative effect of election years is observ-
able from 1837 to 1932, when reelection was
uncommon, and for second-term presidents from
1791 to 1836.2
This article also provides suggestive evidence
that, contrary to findings by Alesina and Rosen-
thal (1995), the competence of a president is a
substantial predictor of growth and interacts with
effort. One might expect the returns to effort to
be increasing in the ability of the president, so
that the positive effect of election years on growth
would be larger for more capable presidents than
for less capable ones. It is difficult to measure
this difference in an objective way, as historians’
rankings of presidents may be biased by random
factors that influenced growth in the presidents’
terms and made certain presidents appear to be
particularly effective or ineffective in managing
the economy. Using this measure, however, pro-
duces the result that GDP growth and the effect
of election years are substantially higher for
high-quality presidents than for low-quality ones.
Effort might also be expected to be more effec-
tive when the president’s party has majorities in
the House of Representatives and the Senate. The
data provide suggestive evidence to support this
view, and growth is higher and the electoral cycle
is clearer for presidents whose terms began with
undivided governments than for those beginning
with divided governments. One might also expect
the amount of effort that a president exerts to
be greatest for elections that are expected to be
close. In the data, however, the effect of election
years on growth is larger for those who won their
first elections handily than for those whose initial
elections to office were close.
It is not clear how, exactly, the effort of a pres-
idential administration translates into results. We
find that the effect of reelection years on growth
is spread across multiple sectors, with the largest
effects in the services and government sectors,
smaller effects in the finance, insurance, and real
estate and wholesale and retail trade sectors, and
2. These negative effects provide evidence to support
the view that the correlation between growth and the election
cycle is primarily attributable to effort and not due to presi-
dential learning. If growth increased over the election cycle
primarily due to presidential learning, then we would expect
it to rise continuously into the second term. Growth is some-
what higher during presidents’ second terms than during their
first terms, which lends suggestive support to the view that
presidential learning affects growth as well.
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large negative effects in the manufacturing sec-
tor. Given the decline in manufacturing and the
rise in services, the actions taken by the president
might include policies to modernize the economy
through building infrastructure and establishing
rules and property rights for new markets. Some
of the relevant actions may have also involved
trade agreements, deregulation, or tax reductions.
Recent evidence indicates that considerably more
laws are passed in election years than in other
years (Fritze 2010). This effect of effort does not
appear to be associated with a single common
strategy that can be measured in macroeconomic
data. The rise in growth is not accompanied by
rises in inflation or in the growth rate of gov-
ernment spending or private investment, although
federal spending appears to shift slightly away
from national defense.3 There is some evidence
of a reduction in unemployment in reelection
years—an effect that may also result from efforts
made by the president.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION PROCESS
The time-series data in this study are divided
into three eras, based upon changes over time
in the likelihood of reelection. Table 1 shows
the fraction of first-term presidents who ran for
reelection in the general election, the fraction
who won reelection, and an index of historians’
judgments of president quality for three separate
eras in American history. In the first era, from
George Washington in 1789 through Andrew
Jackson in 1836, every first-term president ran for
reelection in the general election, and 71.4%were
reelected. The average of the zero-to-one index
of quality for this era is 0.779. In the second era,
from Martin Van Buren in 1837 through Herbert
Hoover in 1932, all three variables are consider-
ably lower. Only 55.0% of first-term presidents
from this era ran for reelection in the general elec-
tion, only 30.0% were reelected, and the average
rating of quality was 0.407. Grover Cleveland,
3. One variable that comoves with the election cycle is
the electoral cycle for Congress. Between the second and third
years of a president’s term, the likelihood that the president’s
party controls the Senate declines from 0.70 to 0.60, and the
likelihood that the president’s party controls the House of
Representatives declines from 0.65 to 0.40. This drop occurs
for both first- and second-term presidents, however, and it
is not clear how having a divided government would fos-
ter immediate growth. For these reasons, presidential effort
appears like a more plausible explanation for the patterns
observed in the data. Data taken from U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (2011) and U.S. Senate (2011).
TABLE 1
Rates of Party Nomination and Reelection










Observations 7 20 12
Notes: Information on party nominations and elections
taken from 270toWin.com (2011), U.S. Census Bureau
(2014), and U.S. White House (2011c). Index on quality is
based upon historians’ rankings (the weighted average of
rankings presented in Wikipedia 2011), which range from 1
to 43. The index is 43 minus the ranking, all divided by 42.
Calvin Coolidge’s and Lyndon Johnson’s second terms are
classified as first terms, because Johnson was eligible for a
second reelection and Coolidge would have been under the
provisions of the 22nd Amendment. Only presidents who sur-
vived until reelection are included in the sample.
who was unseated after his first term but won 4
years later, is coded as having run but not won
reelection. Primary elections did not occur in the
early years of the country, and candidates from
the same party sometimes ran against one another
in the general election. Parties gradually devel-
oped nominating processes over the 1800s and
1900s, and a few states held the first informal pri-
maries in 1912. The nominating process became
solidified in 1972, when all of the state parties
agreed to formal, binding primary votes (Berg-
Andersson 2004; Coleman 2008; Reiter 1985,
1996; U.S. White House 2011c).
In the third era, from Franklin Roosevelt in
1932 through George W. Bush in 2008, the rates
of being nominated by one’s party and win-
ning reelection and ratings of president qual-
ity are considerably higher than in the second
era. This change may have been driven by the
increased prevalence of primary voting and the
increased ability of sitting presidents to reach
wide audiences through the media. Radio and
television are known to have played a substan-
tive role in increasing the American public’s
awareness and fostering their engagement with
national issues such as politics and the econ-
omy. While both technologies were first invented
in the 1920s, the “golden age” of radio, when
the medium reached its peak popularity, is gen-
erally thought to be in the 1930s and 1940s,
after which it was replaced by the television
(Finkelstein 2000; Hilmes 2011). The radio’s
use as a political tool coincided with its rise
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as a medium of entertainment, as evidenced
by Franklin Roosevelt’s “fireside chats,” which
began in 1933 (Buhite and Levy 2010). The divi-
sion between the second and third eras is selected
to coincide with these fireside chats.
Prior to Franklin Roosevelt’s four-term pres-
idency from 1932 to 1945, the Constitution
included no term limit on U.S. presidents; how-
ever, no president before Roosevelt had served
more than two terms. Congress amended the
Constitution in 1951 to limit presidents from
serving from more than two terms. A president
who ascended to office due to the death of the
previous president may serve three terms, pro-
vided that the first term lasted less than 2 years.
Harry Truman, who was president at the time,
was specifically exempted from this term limit;
however, after losing the primary in New Hamp-
shire, he chose not to pursue a third term (David
1954; U.S. Constitution 1947). Since 1932, only
one other president, Lyndon Johnson, was eligi-
ble for reelection and did not win the nomination;
Johnson served over two terms from 1963 to 1968
but was eligible for a third. Of the 11 presidents
who served since 1932 and survived to reelec-
tion (with Johnson counted twice), two-thirds
won reelection, and the average quality rating
was 0.581.
III. GDP GROWTH AND THE ELECTION CYCLE
A. A. Main Findings
This section examines the main empirical
question of the article—the extent to which real
GDP growth increases during presidential reelec-
tion years. For presidents in the modern era, from
1933 to the present, election years are found to
substantially affect growth, which is more than
1 percentage point higher in the later 2 years
of a typical presidential term than in the first 2
years. Results from quarterly data indicate that
this increase in growth begins in the second half
of the third year—the half of that year that mat-
ters most for the election cycle. In the first era
from 1791 to 1836, when voters typically did not
have information on nationwide economic condi-
tions, we observe the opposite result, with growth
rates declining substantially over a presidential
term. This negative effect also appears in the
second era from 1837 to 1932, when reelection
was uncommon.
The increase in growth in election years in
the modern period only appears for presidents’
first terms in office. For presidents’ second terms,
depending on which dataset is used, growth
is steady over the second term or falls in the
fourth year—a result that is consistent with a
decline in presidential effort near the end of
the second term, just before leaving office. For
two-term presidents in the first two eras, the pat-
tern is the same as for the modern era, with
growth rising in the reelection year at the end
of the first term and falling near the end of the
second term.
B. Detailed Evidence
Figure 1A shows how annual GDP growth
varies with the election cycle for each of the three
eras described in Table 1. Percentage points of
real GDP growth are plotted along the vertical
axis, and the horizontal axis plots the remainder
of the year after dividing by four, or mod(year,4).
Presidential years, which are divisible by four,
appear on the right of the graph. The averages
by mod(year,4) and era are computed over the
full 221-year range of available data. Growth for
the first era is shown by the solid green line.
Growth for the second era is shown by the dashed
blue line, and the solid red line plots growth for
the third era. While the GDP data from the first
two eras (prior to 1932) are the best available,
it should be noted that they are highly imprecise
and rely upon a combination of annual data for
some sectors (such as agricultural and industrial
output) and interpolated data for others. For the
interpolated sectors, constant growth rates are
assumed between decennial censuses.
In the first era, reelection was common, but
voters did not have access to information about
the state of the national economy. In this period,
we observe a negative pattern over the election
cycle, with growth rates around 5% in years 1
and 2 and around 4% in years 3 and 4. We
observe a sharper election cycle in the second
era, when reelection was rare. Growth rates rose
slightly from 3.7% to 4.5% in year 3 and dropped
sharply to 2.3% in year 4. For the third era,
when reelection was common and GDP data
were typically available, we observe a very dif-
ferent pattern, with a sharp increase in growth
from 3.0% in the second year of a term to 4.6%
and 4.7% in years 3 and 4. A similar switch
from a negative to a positive election year effect
appears if the third era is defined to begin in 1929
with Hoover, in 1945 with Truman, or in 1953
with Eisenhower.
Figure 1B uses quarterly data to present a
more detailed view of the election cycle in GDP
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FIGURE 1
Real GDP Growth and the Presidential Election Cycle. A. Annual Growth, 1791–2010. B. Quarterly
Growth, 1875:Q1–2011:Q3
A B
Notes: Annual growth data are calculated using real GDP data from 1790 to 2010 from MeasuringWorth (2014). Quarterly
real GDP growth data from 1949:Q1–2011:Q3 are taken from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011). Real GNP growth for
1875:Q1–1948:Q4 is calculated using real GNP data from Gordon (1986).
growth than can be seen in Figure 1A. These
data begin in 1875:Q1, so that the first era cannot
be shown; the data continue through 2011:Q3.
As with the annual data, these quarterly data are
imprecise for the earlier dates (prior to 1947)
and use a combination of annual information on
some sectors (such as agricultural and industrial
output) and interpolated data for others. For the
second era when reelection was rare, we observe
a steady decline in growth from between 1% and
2% in the first two years to between zero and
slightly negative and 1% in years 3 and 4. For
the third era, we continue to observe a positive
election year effect. This increase is somewhat
less sharp than in Figure 1A, in part due to
differences in the measures and comparatively
due to the addition of the below-average growth
quarters from 2011. Importantly, the rise from
roughly 3% growth to slightly below 4% growth
occurs midway through the third year, when
the primaries are beginning, and it lasts through
the second quarter of the fourth year, the last
quarter for which voters can observe data prior to
the election.
If the increase in years 3 and 4 in the third
era truly reflects the effect of increased effort due
to the incentive to be reelected, then it should
apply for presidents in their first terms, but not
in their later terms, when reelection was either
banned or unlikely. To evaluate this hypothesis,
Figure 2A shows the electoral cycle in GDP
growth for presidents in their first terms, and
Figure 2B shows the 8-year cycle for presidents
who completed exactly two terms.
The results from Figure 2 support the view
that the effects shown in Figure 1 are driven by
reelection incentives. For first-term presidents
in Figure 2A, the decline over the election cycle
for the first era is slightly less than 1 percentage
point, from 4.5% and 4.4% in years 1 and 2 to
3.7% and 3.5% in years 3 and 4. For the second
era, when reelection was rare, we observe a
general decline from 3.9% in year 1 to 2.7% in
year 4, with a slight increase between years 2
and 3. In the third era, we observe an increase
that is somewhat greater than 1%, from 2.6%
and 1.5% in years 1 and 2 to 3.6% and 3.2% in
years 2 and 3.
The results from Figure 2B indicate that this
election cycle is concentrated in the first term.
For two-term presidents in the first two eras, as
shown by the dashed line, we observe a sharp
increase from slightly below 4% growth in the
third year to above 6% in year 4, followed by a
steady decline to below 2% growth in the last two
years of the presidency. For two-term presidents
in 1953 and later, as shown by the solid red line,
we observe a sharp increase from 2.8% and 0.8%
in the first two years to 4.2% and 4.1% in years
1 and 3. Part of this growth reflects selection
bias, as the presidents who are most likely to be
reelected and to enter into the sample as two-
term presidents are those who experienced high
growth during election years. Growth is unsteady
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FIGURE 2
Real GDP Growth by Year of Presidency for First Terms and for Two-Term Presidents, 1797–2008.
A. First Terms and B. Two-Term Presidents
A B
Notes: Real GDP growth is calculated using annual data from MeasuringWorth (2014), as in Figure 1. Only presidents
who were initially elected to office and completed at least one full term are included in the data in panel A. Only presidents
who completed exactly two full, consecutive terms are included in the data in panel B. Washington is not included because the
data begin in the middle of his first term, and Truman is excluded because he was eligible for reelection in 1952. Two-term
presidents before 1933 include Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, and Wilson. Two-term presidents in 1945 and later include
Eisenhower, Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush.
but generally declines in the later term, averaging
3.2% in the last four years. While GDP declines
slightly after year 4, it remains fairly high, and
we do not observe the sort of crash that one would
expect if the election year bump was artificial and
caused by a monetary or fiscal “trick.”
We develop a formal econometric model for
these given graphical results. For a given Presi-
dent i in year t, suppose that the growth rate of
real GDP is determined by the following model:
GDP Growthit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Third YRit(1)
+ 𝛽2Fourth YRit + Yeart
+ Year2t + 𝜖it
where GDP Growthit is the growth rate of real
GDP; Yeart controls for time effects in each year
t; Year2t is the square of Yeart, and 𝜖it is a white
noise error term. Third YRit and Fourth YRit are
the dummy variables for the third and fourth
year of President i’s term in office, respectively.
The parameters 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the coefficients
of interest; they measure the full reduced-form
effects of the change in the growth rate of GDP
in the third and fourth year of President i’s term
in office.
Columns 1–5 in Table 2 show the results
obtained from Equation (1). Columns 6–8 use
a variation of Equation (1) with quarterly data.
These regressions include control variables for
Yeart and Year
2
t , plus quarter of the year dum-
mies to control for seasonal effects. Columns 1
and 2 show results for the first era, from 1791
to 1836; columns 2 and 6 display results for the
second era, with data ranging from 1837 to 1932
in column 2 and from 1875:Q1 to 1933:Q1 in
column 4.4 Columns 3–5, 7, and 8 show results
from the third era, with data ranging from 1933 to
2010 in the annual data and from 1933:Q2 to the
2011:Q3 in the quarterly data. Columns 1, 4, and
7 show data for first-term presidents, and columns
2, 5, and 8 include data for second-term presi-
dents. Because reelection was rare in the second
era, results are shown for first- and second-term
presidents together. The second terms of Calvin
Coolidge and Lyndon Johnson are treated as first
terms, because at the end of those terms, both
had been in office less than 6 years. The sec-
ond terms of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Tru-
man are not included in the data in columns 5
and 8, because both were eligible for reelection.
Because of data limitations, the quarterly data
from 1948:Q4 and earlier use growth in gross
national product (GNP) rather than GDP as the
dependent variable; the specification in column 7
4. Franklin Roosevelt’s second term was the first for
which the inauguration was held on January 20. Previous
inaugurations occurred on March 4, so that the previous
president remained in office for most of the first quarter of
the year after the election.
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TABLE 2
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimates of Effect of Election Cycle on Percentage Points of Real
GDP Growth
























































































R2 0.173 0.521 0.112 0.116 0.220 0.124 0.163 0.220
Observations 26 19 96 48 18 171 196 70
Clusters 7 5 22 13 5 12 13 5
Notes: Each column shows results from a different OLS regression in which the dependent variable is real GDP growth. Columns 1–5 use
annual data, and columns 6 to 8 use quarterly data of annualized growth rates. The annual regressions control for year and year squared, and the
quarterly regressions include those controls plus seasonal dummies for quarters. Due to data limitations, GNP rather that GDP data are used for
1875:Q1–1948:Q4 in the quarterly data; the regression in column 7 includes a control for whether GNP data are used. Standard errors adjust
for clustering by president. Of note, the applied standard error correction is valid asymptotically only. Franklin Roosevelt’s and Harry Truman’s
second terms are omitted from the “second term” regressions because both were eligible for reelection. Sources for growth data described in notes
to Figure 1.
** and * indicate 5% and 10% significance, respectively.
Additional details in the text.
includes a dummy for whether the GNP data are
used.5 All of the standard errors are adjusted for
clustering by president.
The results from Table 2 confirm the gen-
eral findings from Figures 1 and 2. As column 1
shows, there is no effect of election years on GDP
growth for first-term presidents in the first era,
when voters did not have access to information
about nationwide economic conditions. Column
2 shows large but imprecisely estimated and sta-
tistically insignificant negative effects of −2.603
and −2.835 in the third and fourth years in office
for second-term presidents in the first era. This
negative effect could reflect a decline in invest-
ment owing to uncertainty about the identity of
the future president, or could reflect a decline
in presidential effort near the end of the second
term, when departure is imminent.
Column 3 shows a similar and also insignif-
icant negative effect of election years on GDP
growth in the second era, when reelection was
rare and departure was also imminent. Relative
5. Quarterly GDP growth data are available beginning in
1947; however, GNP data are used through 1948 so that the
variable does not switch for any president mid-term.
to the effect in the first era, this negative effect
appears later—in the fourth year rather than
the third—and is less than half the size. In the
quarterly regression in column 6, this negative
effect arises in seven of eight of the quarters in
years 3 and 4, with large and significant effects of
−1.897 and −1.158 in the second and third quar-
ters of year 4. Interestingly, this negative effect
disappears in quarter four of the fourth year, pos-
sibly because the uncertainty about the future has
been resolved by the election.
Among first-term presidents in the third era in
column 4, we observe a statistically insignificant
increase in growth of 0.959 in the third year of
the term and a large and marginally significant
increase of 2.702 in the fourth year. In column 7,
we observe positive effects in the later six of the
eight quarters from years 3 and 4. We observe a
large, positive, and significant effect of 2.196 in
the third quarter of year 3 and a large, positive,
and marginally significant effect of 2.605 in the
fourth quarter of that year. We observe smaller
and statistically insignificant effects of 1.719,
0.934, and 0.628 in the first three quarters of
year 4 and a large, positive, and significant effect
of 3.276 in quarter four of year 4. This last
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positive effect arises after the election and could
not reflect the effects of presidential effort. It
may arise due to a delayed effect of effort in
earlier quarters or the reduced uncertainty asso-
ciated with investors knowing the identity of the
new president.
In results not shown, we examinedwhether the
results in Table 2 were robust to including other
covariates in the model such as partisan effects
and potentially endogenous fiscal measures. For
partisan effects, we created two fractionalization
variables that measure the number of seats con-
trolled by the Democratic Party in the House and
Senate, respectively. Including the two fraction-
alization variables in the estimation model, we
do not observe significant changes in the sign,
magnitude, or statistical significance of the other
explanatory variables. Setting aside the concerns
for endogeneity, we also examined whether the
obtained results are robust to the inclusion of a
growth in government outlays variable. We found
for the 1933–2010 sub-sample that the inclusion
of the growth in government outlays variable
was statistically significant at the 1% level (as
one might expect a priori). The sign and statis-
tical significance of the fourth-year coefficient
in column 4, however, did not change. These
robustness checks suggest that the estimated
coefficients for the third sub-sample are robust
to the inclusion of a variety of other covariates.
We find that some of the estimates are sen-
sitive to the starting dates of the sub-samples.
Using the beginning of World War I as the start-
ing point instead of 1933, we observe that the
signs of the coefficients in column 4 of Table 2
remain the same, but their magnitudes are smaller
than presented in this article. Also, the statistical
significance for the fourth-year coefficient in
column 4 changes from marginally significant
to insignificant. We find similar results when
we shift the starting point for the 1933–2010
sub-sample to begin in 1951.
Among second-term presidents not eligible
for reelection in the third era in column 5, we
observe a large but imprecisely estimated and
insignificant increase in growth in year 3 that dis-
appears to zero in year 4. As the quarterly results
in column 8 show, the increase in year 3 is con-
centrated in the first two quarters of that year. In
the fourth year in the quarterly data, we observe
slight positive and insignificant effects in quar-
ters one and two, a large and significant negative
effect of −3.849 in quarter three, and a large and
insignificant effect of −4.521 in quarter four. As
before, this drop in year 4 may reflect market
uncertainty or a decline in presidential effort. The
samples of years are similar for columns 5 and
8, and the discrepancy between the quarterly and
annual data in year 4—with zero effect in the
annual data but a large negative effect in the quar-
terly data—probably results from differences in
the way inwhich the growth variable is measured.
IV. HETEROGENEITY IN THE EFFECTS OF THE
ELECTION CYCLE
A. Main Findings
This section explores how the largest election-
year increases and decreases in growth vary
across different types of presidents. For presi-
dents from the third era, from 1933 to the present,
the difference in growth between the first 3
years of the term and the election year is posi-
tive for all of the presidents who survived until
reelection except for Jimmy Carter and Dwight
Eisenhower. Large effects can be observed for
Democrats (including Franklin Roosevelt and
Harry Truman) and for Republicans (including
Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Rea-
gan). The returns to effort are probably great-
est for high-quality presidents, and growth is
larger—and the positive election year effect is
larger—for presidents later rated as high qual-
ity by historians than for those later rated as low
quality. The effect of election years is also largest
for presidents whose parties initially controlled
both houses of Congress, a result that suggests
the returns to presidential effort are greatest when
the president’s actions are relatively unimpeded.
Finally, this election year effect is largest for
those presidents who initially commanded high
shares of the electoral vote.
The negative effects of reelection years on
growth in the first and second eras are somewhat
less widespread than is the positive effect in
the third era, with drops in the election year for
about two-thirds of the presidents. The drops
are tremendous for Theodore Roosevelt and
Herbert Hoover and are still very large for many;
however, large positive effects are observable in
a few cases as well. The negative effect of elec-
tion years is most pronounced for high-quality
presidents, for those whose parties initially com-
manded both houses of Congress, and for those
presidents who initially received large shares of
the electoral votes. These interactions between
election years and presidential quality, divided
government, and presidential popularity are the
mirror images of the interactions observed in the
third era and are consistent with the theory that,
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TABLE 3
Percentage Real GDP Growth in Election Years and Non-election Years by President, 1791–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
















Bush II 4.14 1.78 3.47 1.83 1.69* 0.60
Clinton 3.39 3.15 3.74 4.44 0.59 −0.31
Bush I 4.11 1.74 3.39 1.66 −0.49
Reagan −0.27 1.70 7.19 3.73 5.48 0.82
Carter 5.37 4.43 −0.27 −4.71** −4.34**
Ford −0.55 −0.21 5.37 5.58 3.21
Nixon 4.84 2.22 5.31 2.62 3.09 1.21**
L. Johnson 4.37 5.15 5.31 0.16 2.86**
Eisenhower 3.83 3.72 1.98 2.69 −1.75 −2.53**
Truman 8.08 −4.32 4.32 4.95 5.34 4.23*
F. Roosevelt −13.07 6.16 13.05 9.81 1.06 −0.10
Average, 1933–2008 2.20 2.32 4.52 4.42 2.20** −0.17
Hoover 1.15 −3.02 −13.07 −10.05 1.41
Coolidge 13.17 3.28 2.11 −1.17 6.38
Wilson 4.69 −0.33 6.47 1.60 5.40 −3.92
Taft −10.81 3.85 4.69 0.84 −1.53*
T. Roosevelt 5.31 4.03 −7.18 1.78 −12.38* 0.61
McKinley −1.65 7.36 2.51 5.31 −4.33 −3.60*
B. Harrison 5.75 4.59 5.10 0.51 −4.19*
Cleveland 1.72 5.25 2.05 −0.19 −0.72 1.87
Arthur 12.50 4.04 −1.65 −5.68 −3.34
Hayes 4.14 6.61 8.29 1.67 8.15*
Grant 3.90 3.49 8.36 3.58 2.82 −3.19*
A. Johnson 1.13 0 3.90 3.90 1.96
Lincoln 1.02 7.30 1.13 −6.16 −0.35
Buchanan 4.02 3.93 1.02 −2.91 0.23
Pierce 11.55 5.27 4.02 −1.25 2.64*
Fillmore 1.39 6.35 11.55 5.20 0.61
Polk 5.68 7.09 3.37 −3.72** 0
Tyler 0.27 3.46 5.68 2.22 5.93
Van Buren 2.96 2.54 0.27 −2.27 −6.06
Average, 1837–1932 3.57 3.95 2.45 2.42 −1.50 0.45
Jackson 1.35 7.09 4.86 3.26 −2.23
J.Q. Adams 5.93 3.71 1.35 −2.36**
Monroe −0.01 2.63 4.96 5.01 2.33
Madison 0.23 5.91 1.99 2.67 −3.92
Jefferson 5.69 3.24 2.05 2.58 −1.19
J. Adams 3.19 4.45 5.69 1.23
Washington 5.98 5.29 7.67 −0.70
Average, 1791–1836 2.73 4.72 3.74 4.24 −0.98
Notes: This table lists GDP growth for each president who survived until reelection, broken down based upon when the year
fell in the presidential election cycle. Reelection year averages growth in reelection years for presidents prior to 1951 (22nd
Amendment). Annual GDP data fromMeasuringWorth (2014) are used.** and * indicate differences between election years and
pre-election years that are significant under the assumption of independent observations with heteroskedasticity. No significance
test is possible for Ford, who had only one pre-election year and one election year. In addition to the U.S. results, we also examine
whether there is a common growth pattern in the United Kingdom. We employ U.K. growth rates and U.S. President terms for
this test in column 6. For real GDP growth in the United Kingdom, data are from the Bank of England and available from 1830
onwards. Additional details in the text.
when the chances of reelection are relatively
remote, presidential effort to increase GDP
growth declines near the end of the term.
B. Detailed Evidence
Table 3 illustrates how these election year
effects vary across presidents. Real GDP growth
rates are shown from the annual data for every
president who survived to reelection fromGeorge
Washington to GeorgeW. Bush. Column 1 shows
growth in the year preceding office, column 2
shows average growth among non-election years
in the first term, column 3 shows growth in the
reelection year of the first term, and column
4 shows average annual growth in second and
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later terms. Column 5 shows the difference in
mean growth rates between reelection years and
non-election years in the first term. The asterisks
indicate whether the difference is significant or
marginally significant when each year is treated
as an independent observation.
For the third era, the difference in growth
between reelection years and non-election years
is positive for 9 of the 11 presidents (all except
Dwight Eisenhower and Jimmy Carter). None of
the positive differences are significant for spe-
cific presidents, and one (for George W. Bush)
is marginally significant. The negative difference
for Carter is large and significant. When averaged
across all 11 presidents, the difference comes
out to 2.20 percentage points and is statistically
significant. When the standard errors are cor-
rected for clustering by president, this effect is
marginally significant.
Among the 19 presidents in the second era,
growth is lower in reelection years than in other
first-term years in 11 cases. One of these differ-
ences (for James Polk) is significant, and one (for
Theodore Roosevelt) is marginally significant.
When averaged across all of the presidents from
1837 to 1932, this difference is −1.50 percent-
age points and statistically insignificant. Among
the seven presidents in the first era, the differ-
ence between reelection years and other first-term
years is negative in five cases; one of these nega-
tive differences (for John Quincy Adams) is sig-
nificant. The average of these seven differences is
insignificant at −0.98 percentage points.
We obtain real GDP growth data from the
Bank of England to examine whether presi-
dential effort is a proxy for underlying (and
unobserved) factors that are common among
similar economies over time. Notably, the United
Kingdom does not have the same election cycle
as the United States Thus, as a placebo test
for the U.S. results, we report data from 1830
to 2008 for the United Kingdom in column
6 of Table 3 (i.e., using the same dates as in
column 5 rather than U.K. election dates). For
similar periods in the third era, we observe that
the United States experienced positive growth
in first-term reelection years in contrast to the
negative average growth rates in the United
Kingdom. In the second era, average growth for
the United States during reelection years was
lower than non-election years. In comparison, for
the United Kingdom, the opposite is true. These
results provide further evidence that the prospect
of being reelected provides modern-day U.S.
presidents incentives to increase GDP growth
rates during reelection years.
Next, Figure 3 illustrates the degree to which
the election year effect varies systematically with
characteristics of different presidents. All four
panels have the same structure as in Figure 1A,
but the graphs are shown for different types of
presidents. Panels A and B show the electoral
cycle in growth for presidents rated as high and
low quality by historians. Panels C and D are
restricted to data from 1857 to the present, when
the party system had solidified, and they show
results for presidents whose parties did not con-
trol the House and Senate and those whose par-
ties did control both houses at the start of office.
Panels E and F restrict the data to presidents
who were initially elected to office (rather than
through succession) and show results for pres-
idents whose initial elections commanded high
and low fractions of the electoral vote.
The presidential quality index that we use is
computed from the rankings of presidential qual-
ity as presented in Wikipedia (2011). The rank-
ings are computed by using a weighted average
for 17 reputable surveys from presidential histori-
ans and other notable scholars on the subject. The
results in these surveys reflect historians’ views
on overall presidential quality and not specifi-
cally on their economic competency. Economic
policy competence is taken into consideration in
these surveys, but it is not the only factor for the
overall measure. Other measures such as compe-
tency on foreign policy, character, integrity, and
so forth are taken into consideration in the rank-
ings as well.
The quality measures in the literature are dom-
inated by rankings of overall performance. Most
of the other rankings in the literature, which are
not part of the 17 weighted studies in Wikipedia
(2011), are highly correlated with the rankings
that we use. For instance, rankings across mul-
tiple decades such as those from Murray and
Blessing (1983), University of Illinois at Chicago
(2000), and Faber and Faber (2012) have cor-
relations of 0.97, 0.96, and 0.79 with our rank-
ing, respectively. Some rankings such as those
from Faber and Faber (2012) have sub-rankings
of various characteristics of presidents. Faber and
Faber (2012) present ratings for presidents on
foreign relations, domestic programs, adminis-
tration and intergovernmental relations, leader-
ship and decision making, and personal qualities.
These have correlations of 0.40, 0.51, 0.79, 0.78,
and 0.76 with our ranking, respectively. Thus,
the graphs as shown in Figure 3 might change
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FIGURE 3
Growth and the Election Cycle by Type of President and Divided Government. A. Low Quality Index.
B. High Quality Index. C. Initially Divided Government. D. Initially Undivided Government. E. Low






Notes: The presidential quality index is computed from the rankings of presidential quality as presented in Wikipedia (2011),
which range from 1 to 43. The rankings are computed by using a weighted average for 17 reputable surveys from presidential
historians and other notable scholars on the subject. Initial popularity is computed as the ratio of the president’s initial electoral
votes to those of the second place candidate. For both quality and popularity, the low and high categories are determined by which
observations fell above or below the median. Initially undivided government is an indicator for whether the Senate and House
of Representatives both had majorities in president’s party in the president’s first year in office; data taken from U.S. House of
Representatives (2011) and U.S. Senate (2011). Presidents who ascended to office due to death of the vice president are excluded
from the samples in panels C and D. Electoral vote shares are taken from U.S. Census Bureau (1776) and 270toWin.com (2011).
Additional details in the text.
slightly if different types of sub-rankings were
used instead of the index.
The general pattern shown in Figure 1A
appears in most of the panels of Figure 3;
however, the patterns are extreme for some types
of presidents, and the curves are relatively flat
for others. The patterns shown in Figures 3A and
3B provide suggestive evidence that president
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quality is a substantial determinant of economic
performance and that it interacts with presidential
effort. For low-quality presidents in Figure 3A,
GDP growth is mostly between 2% and 4%.
We observe a steady decline in growth over the
election cycle for the first era, and the patterns are
relatively flat for the remaining two eras. For the
third era among low-quality presidents, growth
is highest in the first year (possibly due to lagged
effects of the previous president’s policies)
and increases steadily over years 2–4. Among
high-quality presidents in Figure 3B, growth is
generally higher than for low-quality presidents,
beginning around 3% to 5% for all three eras.
We observe a slightly negative relationship in
the first era, a dramatic negative relationship
in the second era, with a large drop to almost
zero growth in year 4, and a dramatic positive
relationship in the third era, with growth rates
beginning at 3.1% in the first year (probably low
due to lagged effects of the previous president’s
policies) and 3.8% in the second year and rising
sharply to 6.8% and 5.9% in years 3 and 4.
The dashed blue line in Figure 3C shows that,
for presidents in the second era whose parties did
not control both houses of the legislature, eco-
nomic performance was highly variable and does
not follow a clear pattern—growth is initially low
at just below 1% in year 1 of the term, increases
sharply to 6.8% and 6.6% in years 2 and 3, and
drops off somewhat to 4.4% if year 4. As the
solid red line shows, the pattern is also some-
what unclear in the third era. Growth begins at
3.7% in year 1 of the term but drops sharply to
0.9% in year 2, then increases to 3.2% and 4.6%
in years 3 and 4. For cases in Figure 3D of pres-
idents that controlled both houses, the pattern is
clearer. Growth steadily declines over the term in
the earlier era when reelection was uncommon,
as shown in the dashed blue line, which starts
at 4.0% in the first year and drops to 1.1% by
the fourth year. Having control of both houses
appears to be particularly important for growth
in the third era, when reelection was common.
Growth ranged from 0.9% to 4.6%, averaging
3.1% over the 4 years for presidents with divided
governments. For presidents with undivided gov-
ernments in the third era, growth ranged from
3.2% to 5.5%, averaging 4.6% and steadily rising
over the 4 years of the term.
As Figure 3E shows, for initially unpopular
presidents, we observe a generally flat but slightly
negative relationship in the first era. In the second
era, we observe a steady and large increase from
years 1 to 3 followed by a sharp decline in the
fourth year. Finally, we observe a large increase
from 2% to slightly over 3% in the third era.
For initially popular presidents in Figure 3F, the
pattern is more dramatic, with sharp declines
for presidents from the first two eras and sharp
increases for presidents from the third era.
V. SOURCES AND MECHANISMS OF GROWTH
A. Main Findings
This next section examines the ways in which
the election cycle affects growth. Results from
sector-specific growth data from 1948 to 2010
indicate that the electoral cycle in growth is
spread across multiple industries. For first-term
presidents, much of the rise in growth comes
from the services and government sectors. Large
positive effects can also be seen in the whole-
sale and retail trade, and finance, insurance, and
real estate sectors, and a moderate-sized effect
appears for construction. We observe a large neg-
ative effect on growth in the manufacturing sector
and a moderate-sized negative effect in the min-
ing sector. The negative effects for second-term
presidents look much like the mirror image of
the positive effects for first-term presidents. The
negative effect on growth is concentrated in the
wholesale and retail trade sector, with moderate-
sized effects in services, finance, insurance, and
real estate, and communication. The decline is
partially mitigated by an increase in the manu-
facturing sector.
It is not entirely clear how presidential effort
translates into improvements in economic per-
formance. Because the positive effect of elec-
tion years involves a decline in manufacturing
and an increase in services, the growth appears
to be associated with the modernization of the
economy and may involve day-to-day policies
to establish property rights and infrastructure
for this modernization. We observe a decline in
unemployment in election years, and no clear
trends in other macroeconomic variables such as
government spending or inflation. One factor that
may comove with the election cycle is the real
interest rate on federal bonds. Since 1913, inter-
est rates have been affected by policies made by
the Federal Reserve System, which is designed to
be an independent entity but may be influenced
by the president. The real interest rate on federal
bonds is lower in years 2 of 3 of the electoral
cycle for first-term presidents; this reduction in
interest rates in years 2 and 3 may have spurred
investment and had a lagged effect on growth in
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years 3 and 4 of the electoral cycle. Another pat-
tern for which there is suggestive evidence is a
decline in defense-related expenditure in election
years for first-term presidents, accompanied by
increases in federal spending in the “health” and
“other” categories. There is no such change for
second-term presidents. This result is consistent
with presidents focusing more on the economy
and less on national security in election years.
B. Detailed Evidence
Table 4 shows the effects of election years on
growth in modern times, separately for differ-
ent sectors of the economy. Within each panel,
each column shows results from a different OLS
regression. Columns 1 to 11 show results for
different sectors of the economy, and column
12 shows results for all sectors added together.
For each sector, the dependent variable is sector-
specific GDP in the current year divided by total
GDP in the previous year. The regressors of
interest are dummies for the third and fourth
year in the electoral cycle. The coefficients on
these dummy variables can be interpreted as the
amount of growth in GDP caused in that sec-
tor by the third and fourth years in the electoral
cycle. The effects on total GDP growth in col-
umn 12 are approximately equal to the sums of
the effects from columns 1 to 11. The totals are
not exactly equal because the 11 sectors do not
include the “rest of the world” and “residual” sec-
tors. Table 4A shows results for first-term pres-
idents, and Table 4B shows results for second-
term presidents. All of the regressions control
for year and year squared. The sector definitions
change in 1981, and each regression also controls
for a dummy for 1981 or later.6
The results from Table 4 reveal an inter-
esting combination of positive and negative
sector-specific effects. For first-term presidents
in Table 4A, the total 0.248% increase in GDP in
year 3 involves a decline of nearly 1% of GDP
in manufacturing and compensating increases in
GDP attributable to the government, services,
and finance, insurance, and real estate sectors.
We also observe a moderate decline in mining
and a moderate increase in construction in the
third year. In the fourth year among first-term
presidents, we observe a slightly smaller decline
of −0.527% of GDP in manufacturing and larger
6. Sector-specific GDP data are available for both defi-
nitions of sectors for multiple years; 1981 is selected as the
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increases of 0.643% of GDP in services, 0.461%
in government, 0.341% in trade, and 0.305% in
finance, insurance, and real estate, adding to a
total increase of 1.299% of GDP in the fourth
year. We also observe a moderate-sized decline
in mining and a moderate-sized increase in
construction in the fourth year. Notably, we find
high R2s above 0.90 in columns 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
and 10. This suggests that a large portion of the
variation in the GDP growth rates in these sectors
is explained by including dummy variables for
the third and fourth year of President i’s term
in office and control variables including year,
year squared, and a dummy for 1981 or later in
the regressions.
Among second-term presidents in Table 4B,
we observe a large 1.699% increase in GDP in
year 3, two-thirds of which is attributable to
an increase in production in manufacturing. We
continue to observe a large positive effect of
0.584% on GDP due to manufacturing in the
fourth year, but these effects are counterbalanced
by a large decline in growth of trade and moder-
ate declines in growth of finance, insurance, and
real estate, services, and communications, lead-
ing to an overall negative effect of the fourth year
on GDP growth of −0.313%. Similar to the high
R2s found in Table 4A, we find values above 0.90
in columns 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 in Table 4B.
To better understand the mechanisms behind
the electoral cycle in growth, Figure 4 plots a
variety of macroeconomic indicators against
mod(year,4). Figures 4A and 4B show the rates
of growth in real government spending and
revenue for the three eras. Figure 4E shows the
real growth rates in three other key components
of GDP—private domestic investment, con-
sumption, and consumption of durables—for
the 1933–2010 era. Figure 4F shows monthly
unemployment rates for January, 1948 through
October, 2011, presented separately for first-term
and second-term presidents. Figure 4D shows
inflation for the three eras, measured based upon
the GDP deflator. Figure 4C shows the real
interest rates on federal bonds for 1800 to 1899
(excluding 1833–1841, for which no data are
available) and 1934–2011. The earlier data show
the average interest rate on “selected federal
bonds” by Homer and Sylla (2005), and the later
data show the return on 3-month treasury bills
on the secondary market.
As Figure 4A shows, the electoral cycle in
government spending growth varies substantially
by era. In the first era, shown by the green line,
growth in spending was small for the first 3
years of a term and increased substantially in
the election year. In the second era, shown by
the dashed blue line, growth in spending was
higher generally and was greater than 40% in
the second year of the term for reasons that are
not clear. Unlike these earlier eras, the red line
indicates that there is no apparent electoral cycle
to spending growth in modern times, and the
curve is flat across the 4 years of the election
cycle. Government receipts grow fairly steadily
over the election cycle for the era from 1791 to
1836, and they exhibit a rocky increase over the
cycle for 1837–1932. The reason for these rises
is unclear, as they rise at the same time that GDP
growth was declining. In modern times, as shown
by the red line, growth in government revenue is
flat in the third year despite the rise in income
growth, a result that suggests a slight reduction
in tax rates in the third year of the electoral cycle.
Figure 4C provides some very suggestive evi-
dence of electoral cycles in interest rates; how-
ever, it is not clear from these data whether the
patterns reflect causal relationships or simply
sampling variation. For the period 1800–1899,
real interest rates on federal bonds were 0.5–1
percentage point lower in years 3 and 4 than
in earlier years—an effect that may reflect an
attempt to stimulate investment in years close to
the reelection. For the modern period from 1934
to 2011, real interest rates are 3.5% to 3.7% in
August to October of the second year and decline
sharply to 2.3% in April to June of the third year.
The rate hovers between 2.3% and 2.6% through
July of the third year and then increases, rang-
ing from 2.6% to 3.5% through the fourth year.
The decline in real interest rates in years 2 and 3
could reflect strategic behavior, if the government
wished to stimulate investment, which it believed
had a lagged effect on growth.
As with government spending, the relation-
ship between inflation and the electoral cycle
varies by era, as shown in Figure 4D. In the
first era, inflation declines steady from the first
to the fourth year in office. In the second era, we
observe three relatively low rates of inflation and
a sharp increase in the fourth year. In the modern
era, we observe an inverse u-shape, with slightly
higher rates of inflation just below 4% in years 2
and 3 of the presidential term, relative to rates just
above 3% in years 1 and 4. This rise in inflation in
years 2 and 3 mirrors the decline in the real inter-
est rate over the same period, but this pattern does
not appear to match with a clear election-based
strategy, unless it involves a strategy for reducing
real interest rates in years 2 and 3.
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FIGURE 4
Other Macroeconomic Variables and the Presidential Election Cycle. A. Government Spending. B.
Government Receipts. C. Interest Rates on Federal Bonds. D. Inflation. E. Investment, Consumption,






Notes: Government spending and receipts data taken from U.S. Census Bureau (2014). Consumption, durables consumption,
and gross domestic private investment taken from U.S. Census Bureau (2014) and U.S. White House (2011a). Inflation for
earlier years taken from GDP deflator on MeasuringWorth (2014). Later interest rate on treasury bonds and inflation in later
years measured using monthly consumer price index from U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2011). Unemployment rate
taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011). Interest rate in earlier years is missing 1833 to 1841 and is taken from Homer
and Sylla (2005).
For the other components of GDP in the third
era, as shown in Figure 4E, we observe that real
growth in private investment spikes in year 2,
when the real interest rate is lowered. In 2010,
private domestic investment is roughly 12% of
GDP, and 12% growth in investment would con-
tribute 1.5 percentage points of growth in GDP.
Investment growth also rises in year 4 for reasons
that are not entirely clear. Consumption naturally
increases with income, and as GDP growth rises
over the election cycle, both total consumption
and consumption of durables rise as well.
Themonthly data from 1948 to 2011 on unem-
ployment in Figure 4F do appear to show an elec-
tion cycle. For first-term presidents, we observe
a steady rise in the unemployment rate over the
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TABLE 5
OLS Estimates of Effects of Election Cycle on Tax Rates, Inflation, and Growth in Government
Expenditures by Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: First Term Presidents











































R2 0.750 0.729 0.110 0.397 0.129 0.038 0.651 0.119
Years 49 48 44 44 44 44 44 44
Presidents 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12

































R2 0.953 0.902 0.213 0.169 0.700 0.210 0.870 0.080
Years 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Presidents 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Notes: Table is structured in the same way as Table 4. Tax rates are taken from Tax Policy Center (2011a, 2011b). Inflation is
taken from the GDP deflator in MeasuringWorth (2014). Federal spending by category is taken from U.S. White House (2011b).
Each regression controls for year and year squared, and standard errors adjust for clustering by president.
first 3 years, followed by a sharp drop from 5.6%
near the end of the third year to 5.0% at the
start of the fourth year; the rate declines fur-
ther to 4.8% by the end of the fourth year. This
drop is slightly less pronounced but still appears
when 2009–2011, 3 years with particularly high
unemployment, are dropped from the sample. For
second-term presidents, we observe some evi-
dence of an election cycle, but it is less pro-
nounced, with a temporary increase in unem-
ployment from 4.5% to 5.1% in the second year
in office and a steady rise in the later part of
the fourth year, from 4.4% in April to 5.2%
in December.
The final set of evidence comes from Table 5,
which explores specific policies in greater detail
for the period from 1933 and later. The structure
of Table 5 is the same as for Table 4, with separate
panels for first- and second-term presidents. The
outcome variables include maximum marginal
income tax and corporate tax rates in columns 1
and 2, inflation in column 3, and growth in real
government expenditure, broken down by major
function: defense in column 4, health (includ-
ing Medicare) in column 5, income security pro-
grams in column 6, Social Security in column 7,
and all other federal expenditures in column 8.
The results from Table 5 help to clarify some
of the findings from Figure 4. Figure 4B showed a
slight increase in tax revenue in year 4 in the later
period, presumably attributable to rising income
in election years. In column 1 of Table 5A, we
obtain the imprecise results that, relative to the
first 2 years of the term, income tax rates are
0.289 and 681 percentage points lower in years 3
and 4 for first-term presidents. The effect is larger
for corporate taxes, with declines of 1.710 and
1.377 percentage points in years 3 and 4. It is
unlikely that this pattern is driving the electoral
cycle in growth, however, as larger drops in taxes
are observable among second-term presidents
(for whom growth decreases in election years)
in Table 5B. In column 3, we observe a slight
increase of 0.662 percentage points in inflation
in year 3 of first-term presidents’ terms and slight
decreases in inflation in years 3 and 4 of second-
term presidents’ terms. The slight increase for
first-term presidents does not continue into the
fourth year, however, and the relationship does
not appear to be sufficiently strong to support
the contention by Nordhaus (1975) that the rise
in real growth is driven by inflation. We observe
declines in inflation of −1.170 and −0.943 in
years 3 and 4 for second-term presidents.
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One notable, although statistically insignifi-
cant, change in fiscal policy that can be seen in
columns 4 to 8 is that growth in defense spending
declines for first-term presidents, with growth
6.437 and 1.520 percentage points lower in years
3 and 4 than in earlier years. Corresponding
increases of +6.283 and +2.394 percentage
points can be seen in health-related expendi-
tures, and we observe a large 10.96 percentage
point increase in expenditures in the “other”
category during the fourth year. This pattern
does not appear for second-term presidents, for
whom we see moderate-sized declines in elec-
tion years in growth in the income security and
“other” categories.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study presents new evidence that the
president plays a substantial role in influencing
GDP growth. Sitting presidents in their first terms
face strong incentives to increase growth in elec-
tion years; presidents in later terms face no such
incentive. To the extent that the president’s effort
influences economic activity, we should observe
increases in growth in election years for first-
term presidents but not for second-term presi-
dents. Using data from 1933 to the present, we
find that growth increases by 1.0 to 2.7 percent-
age points in the third and fourth years of first-
term president’s terms. There is no such pattern
for second-term presidents or for presidents in
earlier eras, when reelection was rare. Many of
the specifications show a decline in GDP growth
at the end of second-term presidents’ terms, an
effect that is consistent with a decline in pres-
idential effort as departure becomes imminent.
The positive effect of reelection years on GDP is
concentrated among high-quality presidents, for
whom the returns to effort are probably largest.
The effect is spread across multiple sectors of the
economy and coincides with a drop in unemploy-
ment and a slight shift in federal spending away
from national defense and toward other sectors.
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